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SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE LAW
Harold P. Green*
During the past decade, the scientific community has been
perturbed by a series of revelations of scientific misconduct,
some including apparent outright fraud or falsification in the
conduct or reporting of research. The inferences to be drawn
from these revelations are matters of disagreement. 1 Some scientists believe that publicity about these affairs has been "grossly
exaggerated," conveying the erroneous impression that fraud in
science is widespread, thereby damaging the image of science,
and that the mistakes and misinterpretations that do occur are
inevitably detected and corrected. 2 Others worry that the recent
disclosures signify that fraud in science is widespread,.and that
these instances of misconduct may represent only the tip of the
iceberg. One study found thirty-four cases of "known or suspected cases of scientific fraud" from Hipparchus in ancient
Greece to the immunologist Arthur Hale in 1981. Even more disturbing, fifteen of these cases are post-1970. 3
The two views of scientific misconduct can be capsulized in
the comments of Dr. Phillip Handler, former President of the
National Academy of Sciences, and the book by Nicholas Wade
and William Broad, two journalists who have investigated scientific fraud. Dr. Handler, speaking before a House Subcommittee,
argued that, because exposure of scientific fraud is inevitable,
only "psychopathic behavior" or "minds which ... may be considered deranged" will produce fraud." On the other hand,
Broad and Wade assert that Handler's "conventional ideology of
science" cannot explain the phenomenon of fraud. In their view,
• Professor of Law, The George Washington University National Law Center. A.B.,
1942, J.D., 1948, University of Chicago.
1. See S1GMA X1, THE Sc1ENTIF1c RESEARCH Soc'v, HONOR IN Sc1ENCE 1-2 (1984) [hereinafter SIGMA X1].
2. See Fraud in Biomedical Research: Hearings on Fraud in Biomedical Research
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-39 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings on Fraud)

(statements of Dr. Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences, and Dr.
Donald Frederickson, Director, Mitional Insts. of Health).
3. W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 225-32 (1982).
4. Hearings on Fraud, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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scientists have a dual motivation: to understand the world and
to obtain personal recognition. Fraud, they say, is a phenomenon
that has occurred throughout the history of science, and many of
those who committed fraud-including such luminaries as
Newton, Mendel, and Millikan-did so to persuade their colleagues of a theory they knew to be correct even though their
experiments did not turn out exactly as expected. 11 Accordingly,
"history has been kind to scientists such as these . . . because
the theories turned out to be correct."6 Whatever the reason, although in the past "[t]he occasional instances of misconduct
were thought to be unique ... , [m]ore recent experience suggests that, at the very least, the incidence of reported misconduct has increased."'
The scientific community has been sufficiently shaken by recent experiences that many associations, universities, and research institutions have moved to establish procedures for dealing with misconduct in science. The underlying rationale is
succinctly stated in a report published by the Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC): 8
The responsibility of the scientific community to the
public is acknowledged. The maintenance of public trust
in this pursuit is vital to the continuing vigor of the biomedical research enterprise. Loss of this trust because
of isolated instances of dishonest behavior on the part of
a few researchers could cause great harm by calling into
question in the mind of the public the validity of all new
knowledge and the integrity of the scientific community
at large. In short, it is in the best interest of the public
and of academic medicine to prevent misconduct in research and to deal effectively and responsibly with instances where misconduct is suspected. 9
Although Dr. Handler's view was that "falsification of data .
need not be a matter of general societal concern," 10 the AAMC's
rationale compels recognition that scientific fraud is indeed a
matter of societal concern. The responsibility of the scientific
5. W. BROAD & N. WADE, supra note 3, at 212-13.
6. Id. at 213.
7. Special Issue-Policies and Procedures For De9ling with Possible Misconduct in
Science, 15 NIH GumE, July 18, 1986, at 1 [hereinafter Special Issue].
8. ASSOCIATION OF AM. MEDICAL COLLEGES, THE MAINTENANCE OF HIGH ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH (1982) [hereinafter AAMC REPORT].
9. Id. at 1.
10. Hearings on Fraud, supra note 2, at 10.
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community to the public flows from the fact that scientific research, at least in the nonprofit sector, is funded largely by the
federal government. Indeed, the reaction to Dr. Handler's point
of view at a hearing before a House Subcommittee ranged from
astonishment to outrage. 11
Because public policy is implicated by scientific misconduct,
the legal profession should be interested in overcoming this
problem. This Article studies the scientific misconduct problem
and provides a personal view of the legal dilemmas that confront
those who report misconduct. Part I describes how the scientific
community currently deals with alleged fraud. Scientists primarily rely on the peer review system and toothless guidelines. Part
II illustrates the problems in the present system through a case
study of an allegation of misconduct. The author represented a
man who reported scientific misconduct; the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) investigation took five and one-half years. This
Article concludes that lawyers should become more involved in
the investigation and adjudication of scientific fraud to assist
the scientific community in preserving the due process rights of
the accused, maintaining the integrity of the scientific community, and encouraging exposure of misconduct.
I.

EXISTING APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH MISCONDUCT

Only five years ago, very few institutions had given any significant thought to the problem of dealing with scientific misconduct. As Dr. Handler testified, "I will admit ... the absence of
any sense of what due process should be when some suspicion is
aroused." 12 To be sure, the problems of due process are daunting. First, the substantive content of "misconduct" has never
been defined in a generally accepted man~er. A significant question is whether the elements of misconduct should be codified,
or whether they should evolve, like the common law, on a caseby-case basis. Second, an allegation of scientific fraud can impact substantially on several important interests that warrant
protection.
Obviously an allegation of fraud, regardless of how it is resolved, can have a profound effect on the career of the alleged
wrongdoer. It may also impact his or her supervisors and coau11. Hearings on Fraud, supra note 2.
12. Id. at 43.
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thors, 13 as well as those who "refereed" the reports of the research prior to publication. The employing institution is in a potential "catch-22" situation. A confirmation that fraud has taken
place suggests that the institution has employed less than adequate supervisory, review, and quality control procedures, and
this cannot help but be damaging to the institution. On the
other hand, failure to seek out the truth could be equally damaging. If the research has been publicly funded, particularly if it
is in some way politically sensitive, allegations of fraud could
produce substantial political fallout. If the suggestion or accusation of fraud comes from a "whistle-blower" colleague, that colleague has an interest in how the matter is handled. Whistleblowers are subject to retaliatory action by the institution, by
colleagues, and by the accused. They, however, should be held
accountable if it turns out that the allegations were clearly unfounded, irresponsible, or viciously motivated.
It is understandable that scientists would have some difficulty
in coping unassisted with due process implications of such issues. If, however, these issues raise public policy questions requiring changed procedures and reform of long-accepted principles, the legal profession has a great deal to offer science in a
serious and constructive effort to cope with these new, or newly
perceived, problems.
A.

The Peer Review System

Science is a vast enterprise embracing many diverse disciplines. These disciplines are frequently broken down into subdisciplines. The disciplines, and often the subdisciplines, may
have little in common with each other except that they are all
concerned with the acquisition of knowledge and the pursuit of
truth. Although it has been asserted that "the principles governing the way that research is carried out and reported are the
same in geography as in physics, in medicine as in archaeology,"
it must also be recognized that "habits and conventions" differ
from one field to another. 14
Science is not a profession like medicine and law. One does
not need a license to practice science; and, although those scien13. It was reported in February 1987 that a respected NIH scientist committed suicide as a result of pressures resulting from an investigation he helped initiate of alleged
scientific fraud by a member of his staff. NIH Scientist a Suicide Amid Probe of Paper,
Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
14. SIGMA XI. supra note 1, at 23.
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tists concerned with a particular discipline or subdiscipline organize associations or societies, these are generally concerned
only with advancing the state of knowledge within their sphere
and not with determining the qualifications or establishing standards of conduct for their members.
For these reasons, science has no formal mechanism for selfregulation and no formalized ethical codes. This is not to say,
however, that science is a refuge for villains and charlatans.
There are informal but regularized ways in which candidates are
admitted to, and advance within, science. These center upon the
process of "peer review."u
Recognition of scientific scholarship is a function of the scientist's research accomplishments. These accomplishments become
known when scientific journals publish descriptions of a scientist's research and its results. Scientific journals are, however,
"refereed." The journal will send the manuscript to scientists regarded as the author's peers for critical comment, suggestions
for improvement, and a recommendation whether the paper
warrants publication. The peers who act as referees are, therefore, the gatekeepers who, in conjunction with the editors, control access to, and advancement in, the world of science. If the
research and results described in the article are sound, other
scientists should be able to repeat the research and obtain the
same results. It is in this sense that it can be said that
"[s]cientists may be fallible, but science is self-correcting," 16
since inability to replicate the reported results signals that there
has been error on the part of the author of the paper.
There are, however, some potential problems with the peer review system. Peers naturally tend to relate the quality of a paper
to the manner in which it builds on existing knowledge. Peer
review is therefore a force for conservatism that tends to discourage large steps forward and unorthodoxy generally. 17 Moreover, at the same time peer review operates as a defense against
scientific error or misconduct, it provides splendid opportunity
for the referees to engage in misconduct of their own. Peers are,
after all, at least potential competitors of the scientist whose
manuscript they are reviewing, and they can attempt to turn
their function to personal advantage by the suggestions and rec15. Id.
16. Id. at 2.
17. See W. BROAD & N.

WADE,

supra note 3, at 100-02.
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ommendations they make or, indeed, by appropriation of ideas
or information in the manuscript. 18
Peer review has not uncovered major pieces of outright scientific fraud that have been published in major journals and garnered honors for their authors. For example, belated inquiry
into the research of Dr. John Darsee at Emory and Harvard
Universities led to the retraction of numerous articles he had
published in refereed medical journals because of apparent falsification of research and research results. These phenomena may
be attributable to the lethargy, ineptness, or negligence of the
referees or to the cleverness of the culprit. On the other hand, it
has been asserted that a referee "is not a cop and should not be
expected to determine whether a research report has been honestly produced," but rather is expected only to advise whether
the reported results are sufficiently important to merit
publication. 19
An article published in Nature in January i987 used the Darsee case to explore the prevalence of apparent misconduct notwithstanding peer review. 2 ° From 1978 to 1981, Darsee was author or coauthor of eighteen full-length research papers
published in major journals and of about one hundred abstracts,
book chapters, reviews, and short papers. A total of forty-seven
scientists had coauthored one or more of these publications with
him. The Nature article, by two NIH scientists, Walter W.
Stewart and Ned Feder, reviewed these papers, which they conceded were a "sample of convenience,"21 and not necessarily representative, to explore the vigilance of referees, editors of the
journals, and Darsee's coauthors in "meeting the standards conventionally accepted as necessary in the scientific literature." 22
Recognizing that the finding of "errors" was in part subjective
and that many of the errors and discrepancies they found were
"minor," they nevertheless reported that most of the papers
contained "errors or discrepancies that can be recognized simply
by examining them carefully,"23 and that some errors were "so
18. Dr. Handler pointed out that "perhaps fifty knowledgeable individuals ... have
such an opportunity" to misappropriate an idea contained in a research proposal they
referee, and reported with gratification that accounts of "transgressions" are "very, very
rare indeed." Hearings on Fraud, supra note 2, at 21.
19. SIGMA X1, supra note 1, at 6.
20. Stewart & Feder, The Integrity of the Scientific Literature, 325 NATURE 207
(1987).
21. Id. at 207.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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glaring as to offend common sense. " 2 ' As an example of the latter, they cited a paper depicting a family with a high incidence
of an unusual form of heart disease. The family pedigree, as described in the Darsee paper, indicated that a seventeen-year-old
male had four children ranging in age from four to eight; his
sister, brother, and first cousin had their first children at ages
sixteen, fifteen, and fifteen respectively; and three women in the
family had their last children at ages forty-one, forty-five, and
fifty-two. 211
Stewart and Feder reported that among the eighteen research
papers there were as many as thirty-nine errors or discrepancies
in a single paper, with an average of about twelve per paper. 26 Of
the twenty-two scientists who were coauthors of a research paper, nineteen were coauthors of at least one paper with ten or
more errors or discrepancies. 27 In addition, Stewart and Feder
found that in numerous cases the coauthors had not retained the
data on which the publications were based;28 that in many cases
the coauthors were merely "honorary authors" with no direct involvement in the research; 29 that some papers embo~ied statements and data that impeded the reader's ability to reconstruct
the manner in which the research was conducted; 30 and that a
number of the papers had previously been published in a different journal without attribution in the subsequent paper. 31
24. Id. at 208.
25. An editorial in Nature lamely suggests that the "bizarre pedigree" would be less
puzzling "if the ages given in the original paper were intended to mean something other
than chronological age." Editorial, Fraud, Libel and The Literature, 325 NATURE 181,
182 (1987); see infra note 31.
26. Stewart & Feder, supra note 20, at 209.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 210.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 211. The Stewart-Feder article was first submitted to Nature in 1983,
which declined to publish it in its original form because of threats of libel suits. Editorial, supra note 25, at 181. After considerable give and take, a revised version was finally
published. Still, the article carries a bold type legend stating that "(s]ome editorial
changes have been made in this manuscript without the consent of the authors." Stewart
& Feder, supra note 20, at 214. The article is preceded in the same issue by an editorial
critical of the authors, skeptical of their methodology, but concluding "for all this, what
Stewart and Feder have written deserves close attention." Fraud, Libel and the Literature, supra, at 182. In addition, immediately following the Stewart and Feder article was
a "reply" by Dr. Eugene Braunwald, who was Darsee's supervisor at Harvard and who
reportedly was among those who threatened a libel suit. Braunwald, On Analysing Scientific Fraud, 325 NATURE 215 (1987).
According to an article by Philip M. Boffey in April 1986, based on an earlier (probably the original) version of the manuscript, Stewart and Feder concluded that many of
the Darsee coauthors had engaged in " 'misconduct' with the potential to undermine the
accuracy of science," and "that they 'knew or should have known' " that some of the
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Guidelines for Scientific Conduct

1. The Edsall Report- The beginnings, although indirect, of
the scientific community's efforts to deal with scientific misconduct came with the establishment by the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) of a Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility. The impetus, in part, for its
establishment was the concern that two scientists were retaliated against by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) because
they had vigorously and publicly argued that the AEC's standards for protection against ionizing radiation were too lax. The
committee was initially established in response to Senator Edmund Muskie's request that the AAAS look into the allegations
of administrative harassment of the scientists, but the AAAS
soon thereafter decided to broaden the inquiry.
.Accordingly, the committee was charged (1) to study and report on the general conditions required for scientific freedom
and responsibility, (2) to develop suitable criteria and procedures for the objective and impartial study of these problems,
and (3) to recommend review mechanisms for instances where
scientific freedom is alleged to have been abridged or otherwise
endangered, or where responsible scientific conduct is alleged to
have been violated. 32 The committee had a blue-chip membership, including former Chief Justice Earl Warren. 33
The committee was constituted in December 1970, and its final report, prepared for the committee by Dr. John T. Edsall,
Professor Emeritus of Biochemistry at Harvard University, was
submitted in 1975. 3 " Because at that time concerns about widespread scientific fraud had not yet begun to emerge, it is not
surprising that the Edsall Report did not deal with the subject
directly. Rather, the Report concentrated on the responsibilities
of scientists with respect to, first, the conduct of scientific activities that might be harmful to society and, second, the failure of
scientists to conduct and support activities that might be benefistatements in their publications were false. Boffey, Major Study Points to Faulty Research at Two Universities, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1986, at Cl, col. 4.
32. The third charge originally called upon the committee to study and report on
specific instances rather than to develop mechanisms to enable such review. The charge
seems to have been modified because of doubts that the AAAS should enter the thicket
of passing judgment on specific cases.
33. The history encapsulated in this and the preceding paragraph is based on a review of documents on file at the AAAS offices in Washington, D.C.
34. J. EDSALL, SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (1975) (report of AAAS
Comm. on Scientific Freedom & Responsibility).
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cial. Accordingly, the Report's main thrust related to issues of
the kind raised by the AEC's alleged harrassment of scientists
for speaking out contrary to the "party line" and to "whistleblowing" generally.
Issues of scientific freedom and scientific responsibility were
regarded as "basically inseparable."Sli In the committee's view,
scientific freedom is not in any sense unique, but is granted by
society as necessary for the advancement of beneficial knowledge. 36 Scientific freedom is therefore dependent upon the exercise of the responsibilities that arise from the possession of special knowledge. When scientists become aware of action or
inaction in the realm of science that they believe will be harmful
to the public interest, they have both the right and the responsibility to blow the whistle, but "the responsibilities are primary."37 In other words, the Edsall Report takes the position
that scientists should be encouraged to be whistle-blowers when
serious issues are involved and that they should have assurance
of some form of due process in passing judgment on the questions they raise. 38
Although the Edsall Report did not explicitly address scientific misconduct, it laid down a principle that is clearly relevant:
"One of the basic responsibilities of scientists is to maintain the
quality and integrity of the work of the scientific community." 39
Scientists, therefore, have a duty to blow the whistle when they
have reason to believe there is scientific fraud. Moreover, the
Edsall Report explicitly condemns other forms of misconduct inherent in the peer review system-opportunities for misappropriation and the taking of unfair advantage.4°
2. The Sigma Xi statement- The principle that scientists
have an affirmative responsibility to expose dishonest or unacceptable practices in science received further support in 1984
with the publication of a statement by Sigma Xi, the honor society of science, that was intended as "practical advice" to those
entering careers in science;n The statement views whistle-blowing as necessary to maintain the integrity of scientific research,
and tells young scientists they cannot turn their backs on scientific misconduct. At the same time, the honor society cautions
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8-10.
SIGMA

X1, supra note 1, at preface.
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young scientists that one who blows the whistle faces "problems
and danger~" including the hostility of colleagues, academic censure, dismissal, professional ostracism, and lawsuits.' 2
3. The AAMC recommendation- In 1984, the Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) recommended to its members that they should adopt procedures to investigate and resolve allegations of fraud in an expeditious, thoughtful, fair, and
judicious manner. 43 Guidelines for such procedures were also
suggested. According to the AAMC, a principal consideration in
such procedures should be protection of the rights and reputations of all parties involved, including those who reported the
perceived misconduct in good faith;" The guidelines contemplate an initial review by the dean or the institution head to
screen out "blatantly frivolous" allegations, followed by an "initial review" by a committee to determine whether further investigation is required. If the committee recommends further action, the researcher involved is to be notified along with any
collaborators and an investigation is to be conducted.' 11 If the
allegations are not substantiated by a thorough investigation,
"appropriate action" should be taken against the whistle-blower
if his or her "involvement in leveling unfounded charges was
demonstrated to have been malicious or intentionally
dishonest. "'6
4. The government approach to fraud- The problem of scientific misconduct is one that should be dealt with in the first
instance by the employing institution, but federal funding agencies obviously have a strong interest in the integrity of science at
institutions that are their grantees. These agencies have begun
to consider adopting rules to ensure that cases of alleged or suspected misconduct are adequately and fairly investigated and resolved.., The adequate and fair resolution of these cases involves
a number of issues that must be clarified. First, scientific misconduct must be defined. Second, the duty of enforcement must
be placed on the research institutions so that concern for repu42. Id. at 29 (quoting Oakes, Protecting the Rights of Whistleblowers and the Accused in Federally Supported Biomedical Research, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH 111, 111 (J. Swazey & S. Scher eds. 1982)).
43. AAMC REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id. at 4-5.
46. Id. at 6.
47. On July 18, 1986, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) published Policies and
Procedures for Dealing with Possible Misconduct in Science. Special Issue, supra note
7.
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tation does not preempt thorough investigations. Third, the degree of protection accorded whistle-blowers must be determined.
A threshold question is the definition of scientific fraud, and
whether this definition should be codified. There are some kinds
of conduct that all scientists would condemn. No one would argue that it is justifiable for scientists to fabricate or deliberately
misrepresent research results or to use their participation in the
peer review process for advancement of personal objectives. Beyond these obvious cases, however, there are murky differences
between fraud, on the one hand, and error, carelessness, or poor
practices on the other; the ambiguities are compounded when
one gets into the traditions, courtesies, and practices associated
with scientific publications and journals. Moreover, the standards, or at least the relevant "habits and conventions"48 for determining misconduct may vary from one scientific discipline to
another. For example, one would expect that judgment would be
at least somewhat different for astronomy than for medical science; and even within medical science, the standards might vary
depending upon whether the researcher was a scientist, a physician, or both, in connection with the particular conduct.·
These difficulties make it unlikely that a substantive code of
scientific probity could be formulated easily. One is tempted to
suggest, assuming the investigation is adequate and in good
faith, that, like hard-core pornography, one knows scientific misconduct when one sees it. The questions whether codification
should be attempted and, if so, how the effort should be implemented, are ones that could usefully be considered in the context of constructive collaboration between scientists and lawyers.
The legal profession, after all, has had generations of experience
in attempting to codify some very difficult concepts.
In July 1986, the Public Health Service (PHS) published policies and procedures for handling scientific misconduct in which
it undertook to define "scientific misconduct" in the context of
the use of PHS research funds and direct transactions with the
PHS. 49 The definition embraces
(1) serious deviation, such as fabrication, falsification, or
plagiarism, from accepted practices in carrying out research or in reporting the results of research; or (2) material failure to comply with Federal requirements affecting
specific aspects of the conduct of research-e.g., the pro48.
49.

See supra text accompanying note 14.
Special Issue, supra note 7.
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tection of human subjects and the welfare of laboratory
animals. 110
Excluded from the definition are deviations from policies that
may result from a "weakness in institutional controls or disagreements between an awardee institution and a PHS component. "111 More significantly, the definition does not encompass
"certain types of possibly inappropriate practices that should be
of concern to scientists everywhere but do not necessarily call
for Federal action. . . . [These include] coauthorship practices,
recognition of collaborators, and multiple publication."112 Although such practices are not within the scope of the policies
and procedures, the PHS "encourages institutions, professional
societies and individual scientists to address [such] broad questions of scientific conduct." 113 Essentially similar guidelines have
been promulgated by the National Science Foundation (NSF)
for dealing with misconduct under NSF grants. 114
Once the definition of scientific misconduct has been ascertained, the research institutions must enforce it. It is imperative
that institutions employing scientists clearly understand that
scientific misconduct will not be tolerated, and that the burden
of policing scientific conduct rests squarely upon them. They
must be convinced that even though a determination that one of
their scientists engaged in misconduct may cost them "points"
with granting agencies and others, by indicating that their supervision of research may not have been adequate, whitewashing
scientific misconduct will cost them even more. Although it is
important that investigations proceed with due regard for protection of the reputation and interests of those who are "accused," the primary purpose of the investigation is to reach a
just conclusion, not to protect reputations. 1111 These are messages
that must be delivered by the federal granting agencies, and it is
important that these agencies be more than pious preachers. Indeed, there should probably be some kind of appeal/review
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 52 Fed. Reg. 4158 (1987) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 689) (proposed Feb. 10,
1987).
55. The emphasis on protecting reputations probably reflects a predisposition within
the scientific community to regard scientific fraud as a rare event and a presumption
that allegations of fraud will turn out not to have substance. Interestingly, there seems to
be little concern about the reputation of the whistle-blower. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 44; see also Special Issue, supra note 7, at 11, 34.
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mechanism for monitoring decisions reached and actions taken
by grantee institutions with respect to alleged scientific misconduct. Here again, lawyers can be helpful in developing such
procedures.
Lastly, even if institutions shrink from actively encouraging
whistle-blowing "snitches," those who have the courage to blow
the whistle should be protected and given some measure of presumption of having acted in good faith. As noted above, both
Sigma Xi and AAAS encourage scientists to take the initiative in
bringing reasonably founded suspicions that a colleague's research involves misconduct to the attention of the appropriate
authorities. 118 Indeed, whistle-blowing may be the single most
important means for discouraging and exposing scientific misconduct. A belief that colleagues will lack the stomach or the
will to blow the whistle undoubtedly encourages some scientists
to seek personal gain from misconduct. On the other hand, it is
probably true that most whistle-blowers' allegations will ultimately prove baseless and motivated by animosity, personal
grievances, personality problems, and the like. 117
The treatment of whistle-blowers therefore presents important and difficult issues in formulating procedures for dealing
with scientific misconduct. Existing procedures do not contemplate a role for the whistle-blower in the inquiry, but usually
drop the whistle-blower from the cast of relevant characters.
Once the whistle is blown, the institution's organs for inquiry
and investigation take over. If the whistle-blower is involved at
all, it is likely to be only as a witness. Provision is not made for
keeping whistle-blowers apprised of the progress of the investigation, and they are not given the· opportunity to comment on
preliminary findings of fact and conclusions.
In other words, the position of the whistle-blower is analogous
to that of the individual who witnesses the commission of a felony by an acquaintance and calls the police. The matter is then
in the hands of the police and the prosecutors, and the complainant is regarded as one with no special interest, beyond that
of any citizen, in seeing that justice is done. An inquiry into scientific fraud that has been initiated by a whistle-blower is, how56. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
57. The author was an original member of the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility established pursuant to the recommendations in the Edsall Report. See J. EDSALL, supra note 34. During the term of his membership, the committee
actively solicited whistle-blowers to bring their allegations to the committee for consideration. In the author's opinion, a substantial majority of the cases presented to the committee were without merit.
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ever, very much different. To begin with, there is no prosecution
and no prosecutor, but only an investigation to uncover the
facts. Moreover, as noted above, there may be strong motivations for the institution to reach the conclusion that there has
been no misconduct. Finally, the whistle-blower does have a
strong personal interest in the outcome, because she is subject to
criticism and hostility from the scientific community if the
charges are determined to be without foundation, and to disciplinary action if, beyond this, it is determined that she acted
with improper intent.

II.

WHISTLEBLOWING-A CASE STUDY

The centrality of the whistle-blower's role, as well as the tendency to give him relatively short shrift, is vividly illustrated in
a case in which the writer was actively involved for the past six
years. 68
In October 1981, Dr. Jerome Jacobstein, a nuclear medicine
specialist, had reason to believe that one of his colleagues at
Cornell University Medical College (CUMC), Dr. Jeffrey Borer,
a cardiologist, had misrepresented research methodology so as to
make his research results look better; and that in so doing Dr.
Borer had, in at least one instance, led a medical student who
was working on research supervised by Dr. Borer to believe that
it was not improper to mischaracterize methodology so long as
the research results as reported were sound. At the time, Dr. Jacobstein's concerns did not involve a published paper, but rather
a draft "talking paper" prepared by the student and a draft
manuscript of an article that was subsequently published. 69 After several weeks of agonizing soul-searching, and after writing
to Dr. Borer to state his concerns and request an explanation
(Dr. Borer did not respond), Dr. Jacobstein discussed the matter
with the Medical School Dean on December 14, 1981.
The Dean hastily organized a committee of three medical
school faculty members to conduct an inquiry to determine if
the allegations warranted a full-fledged investigation and hear58. For news stories about this case, see Part I: Chronicle of a Scientific Misconduct
Case, Sc1. & Gov'T REP., Nov. 1, 1986, at 1; Part II: Chronicle of a Scientific Misconduct
Case, Set & Gov'T REP., Nov. 15, 1986, at 1; Part III: Chronicle of a Scientific Misconduct Case, Sc1. & Gov'T REP., Dec. 1, 1986, at 1; NIH Upholds Misconduct Charges in
Cornell Case, Sc1. & Gov'T REP., Oct. 1, 1987, at 5; Palca, Cornell Misconduct Case
Grinds Slowly to its Conclusion, 326 NATURE 816 (1987).
59. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
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ing. The committee met for several hours in the afternoon and
early evening of Friday, December 18, 1981, and heard from Dr.
Jacobstein, Dr. Borer, and the medical student. Although Dr. Jacobstein informed the committee that his suspicions were supported by documentary evidence, including the research data
books, the committee apparently did not deem it necessary to
request or to examine any papers. Before the committee adjourned that evening, the chairman wrote in his own hand a
three sentence note to the dean informing him that it was the
unanimous view of the committee that no further action was
warranted with respect to the allegations.
At that point, Dr. Jacobstein retained me to represent him in
his effort to obtain a fair inquiry into his allegations. He emphasized that he wished to pursue this, despite the fact that he had
already accepted a new position at another institution, because
of his strong sense of scientific and social responsibility. He was
convinced that the committee's inquiry had not been fair, because he knew with certainty that the relevant documents supported his allegations. At the same time, he recognized the possibility that there might be a satisfactory explanation for Dr.
Borer's apparent misconduct. Hence, his objective was to obtain
a fair inquiry, not to convict Dr. Borer.
Over the next few months, Dr. Jacobstein paid several thousand dollars for my services. When I recognized that the matter
would probably be drawn out over a long period of time and that
fees for my services would impose enormous financial burdens
on Dr. Jacobstein, I undertook to continue my representation
pro bono publico.
Cornell's internal review procedures were inadequate. When
we sought to interest the University President's Office in the
matter, the Office referred the matter to the university's house
counsel. An attorney in that office, after five months of fruitless
discussion as to acceptable procedures for a satisfactory inquiry,
candidly asserted that his function was to represent the interests
of the medical school. This assertion caused me to break off the
discussions. When I informed him that I intended to take the
matter to the NIH, he threatened orally and in writing that Dr.
Jacobstein and I would be held legally accountable for any damage that might result to the University and its personnel because
of Dr. Jacobstein's allegations. It seems clear that the University's objective was to get rid of the problem as quickly as possible because Dr. Borer was a prominent researcher who attracted
substantial funds to the University. Significantly, shortly after
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the matter was referred to the NIH, Dr. B<;>rer was appointed to
an endowed chair at Cornell.
The case was referred to the NIH on June 8, 1982, and the
NIH initiated an inquiry that continued for five and one-half
years. It appears from the history of the matter there that the
NIH was more interested in developing facts that would exonerate Dr. Borer than it was in facts that would support the allegations against him. On the other hand, although the NIH had no
procedures requiring this, Dr. Jacobstein was given access to the
NIH reports at various stages of its inquiry, with a full opportunity to comment. It is not suggested, therefore, that the NIH
sought to "whitewash" Dr. Borer; rather, its role seems more
properly explicable as stemming from a reluctance to believe
that a scientist of Dr. Borer's stature (and an NIH alumnus)
would be guilty of misconduct.
On September 18, 1987, the Director of the NIH made a final
decision on the Cornell affair based on the NIH Committee's investigation. The NIH concluded that the subject of the Cornell
committee's inquiry of December 18, 1981, based on the issues
Dr. Jacobstein originally raised, "could not be adjudicated."60
Nevertheless, the NIH Committee found significant departures
from the acceptable standard of "record-keeping, of collecting
and recording data, and of reporting results" of research in two
subsequently published papers Dr. Jacobstein brought to the attention of the NIH. 61 It also concluded that there was "no evidence of intentional misconduct in the part of Dr. Borer."62
Moreover, Cornell's inquiry into the matter was faulted.
In reaching these conclusions, the NIH obviously made findings against Dr. Borer only when they were clearly documented
beyond doubt. It was unwilling to balance the conflicting contentions in light of their plausibility and how they fit within the
overall pattern of conduct revealed in the investigation. For example, Dr. Jacobstein's original charges were totally consistent
60. Memorandum from Associate Director for Extramural Affairs, Office of Extramural Research, to Director of the National Institutes of Health 5 (Sept. 17, 1987) [hereinafter Decision Memorandum] (decision regarding the NIH investigation of alleged misconduct at Cornell University Medical College and proposed actions) (copy on file with
U. MICH. J.L. REF.). The basis for this conclusion was that there were "wide discrepancies
between the account of Dr. Jacobstein and the accounts of Dr. Borer and the other participants in the research" that could not be evaluated in the absence of a published
paper. Office of Extramural Research, National Insts. of Health, Review of Alleged Misrepresentations on the Part of Jeffrey S. Borer, M.D., Cornell University Medical College
8 (1987) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
61. Decision Memorandum, supra note 60, at 2.
62. Id.
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with the conduct of Dr. Borer that the NIH found not to meet
accepted standards. Despite this fact, the NIH gave no weight to
Dr. Jacobstein's original charges. Similarly, the NIH did not infer "intentional misconduct" from the careless research and reporting practices that all made Dr. Borer's research results look
better and more credible.
Nevertheless, the NIH imposed fairly stiff sanctions against
Dr. Borer. The principal sanction requires, for the next three
years, that a copy of the NIH findings be provided to any NIH
official who is considering appointing Dr. Borer to a committee
or awarding a grant in which he would be the principal investigator or project leader. 83
With respect to the adequacy of Cornell's internal investigation in December 1981, the NIH observed that "[b]ecause Dr.
Jacobstein's original allegations related to a talking paper and a
draft manuscript, CUMC's conclusion not to pursue the matter
may have been appropriate at the time," but that its "hasty conduct of the inquiry, and the failure to document the findings until later, created understandable doubts about the institution's
willingness to deal with a potential problem."64 The bottom line
was that the NIH officially expressed concern over Cornell's review of Dr. Jacobstein's allegations of misconduct. 6 1i
The NIH let Cornell off too gently. This is evidenced by the
NIH investigation of a 1983 article by Dr. Borer that Dr. Jacobstein alleged contained inaccurate and unsupported statements. 66 The most egregious of the article's misstatements was
that certain medications were withheld from the test subjects
before the experiment. In its draft final decision of February
1987, the NIH concluded that this statement was not accurate.
Thereupon Cornell, which had previously assured the NIH that
its own investigation showed that Dr. Jacobstein's allegations
were without merit, issued a press release. The press release acknowledged that there had indeed been "an error" in the article,
and that Dr. Borer had written a letter to the American Journal
of Cardiology about this inaccuracy. 67 The NIH ultimately con63. Id.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Jordan, Borer, Zullo, Hayes, Kubo, Moses & Carter, Exercise Versus Cold Temperature Stimulation During Radionuclide Cineangiography: Diagnostic Accuracy in
Coronary Artery Disease, 51 J. A.M.A. 1091 (1983). It was a draft of this paper that was
one of the bases for Dr. Jacobstein's original allegations against Dr. Borer.
67. Dr. Borer originally reported that only 4 of 54 patients had received the medication within 24 hours of the study. See New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, Press
Release (Apr. 17, 1987) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
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eluded in its final decision that a "quarter to a third" of the
patients received the medication within twenty-four hours of the
testing, and that Dr. Borer and Cornell failed to reveal in their
previous disclosures the full extent of the erroneous statement in
the published article. 68
The NIH's final decision served to vindicate Dr. Jacobstein
even though it was based on matters other than those originally
raised by him. On the other hand, the NIH's handling of the
case, aside from taking more than five years to complete, appears to be less than adequate from the standpoint of the public
interest. Indeed, the final decision raises almost as many policy
questions as it answers.
NIH policy places primary responsibility on universities and
other research institutions to deal with alleged scientific fraud
and misconduct. Its excessively gentle treatment of Dr. Borer's
culpability and Cornell's role raises considerable questions as to
the extent to which the NIH is prepared to go to ensure that the
institutions discharge their responsibility appropriately.
CONCLUSION

The Cornell case is unusual, probably unique, in a number of
respects. The whistle-blower was exceptionally motivated by his
sense of scientific and social responsibility, and persisted in his
campaign with tenacity over a six year period. Moreover, he had
the unusual assistance of legal counsel in his efforts. A less dedicated scientist, and one who did not have the resources to pay
for a lawyer or the good fortune to find one who would represent
him pro bono, would probably retreat from the cause, discredited and with a tarnished reputation. Those, like Dr. Jacobstein,
who uphold and defend principles of scientific responsibility and
integrity deserve better of the system. For these reasons, and
because legitimate whistle-blowing requires considerable principle and courage, the whistle-blower is entitled to more consideration in an investigation initiated by his or her charges. At the
very least, there should be an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings, or in portions of them, as more than a witness: a
right to be represented by counsel and perhaps to play a role
analogous to that of prosecutor. Certainly, there should be the
same opportunity that is afforded to the alleged wrongdoer to
comment on preliminary findings of fact and conclusions.
68.

Decision Memorandum, supra note 60, at 8.
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Finally, in one way or another, concern about possible liability
or expense arising out of defamation actions should be eliminated from, or at least greatly minimized in, situations involving
possible scientific misconduct. This is another area in which the
scientific community could benefit from legal inputs. One way to
accomplish this would be to require-as a condition of employment as a research scientist-the execution of an instrument releasing from defamation liability any person who in the future
makes any statements to officials of any scientific, educational,
or governmental entity to the effect that the employee has engaged in scientific misconduct, unless the statements made are
determined to be untrue, without any reasonable basis, and to
have been made with malice. Another approach would be for institutions to indemnify a whistle-blower for litigation expenses
and judgments in defamation actions growing out of his or her
allegations that another scientist has engaged in scientific misconduct, unless, of course, it is determined that the allegations
were untrue, without a reasonable basis, and made with malice.
In a society such as the United States, committed to scientific
advance, much of which is supported by the government, it is
particularly important that the integrity of science be maintained. Major reforms are needed, both in the way institutions
deal internally with alleged scientific misconduct and in governmental procedures for ensuring the integrity of science. Although the legal profession to date has sat on the sidelines, and
the scientific community may look upon its entering the game as
superfluous, or perhaps even undesirable, much can be gained,
and nothing lost, from an open and candid discussion of the issues by the two disciplines. 69

69. Such a dialogue is now underway under the auspices of the National Conference
of Lawyers and Scientists, which is a joint undertaking of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science and the American Bar Association. The writer is the ABA
cochairman of the National Conference. See Zurer, Workshop Airs Research Ethics and
Monitoring of Scientific Misconduct, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 5, 1987, at
44, 46.

